Introduction: This essay argues that the unprecedented and widespread insecurity
– terrorism, insurgency, militancy, herdsmen attacks, communal clashes, kidnap
for ransom and extortion (KRE), cultism amongst other security challenges
stifling Nigeria(ns), are inter alia,
a byproduct of Nigeria’s old-school, bureaucratic security and intelligence
establishments’ knack to be REACTIVE rather than PROACTIVE, innovative. As a result
of this inertia, scores of Nigerian citizens are randomly murdered, kidnapped
daily. While the Nigerian security agencies are overwhelmed, helpless and bereft
of pragmatic solutions to the security challenges, the government of the day is
strongly averse to taking responsibility; buck-passing and finger-pointing are
its stock-in-trade.
It beggars belief that while the government maintains an omerta when Nigerians are butchered,
same government swiftly commiserates with foreign governments over tragedies in
their clime. With life expectancy hovering at 54.5 years, one is tempted to
ask, what is the value of life in Nigeria?
Forward-thinking security, intelligence establishments world-over
strive to nip insecurity, crime in the bud. As they say, prevention is better
and cheaper than cure. It is unacceptable, more expensive to allow events
escalate, deteriorate before running helter skelter to fix them. Nigeria, the much
touted giant of Africa has suffered manifold national security embarrassments
lately and in the past due to the failings of its potpourri security and
intelligence agencies. This explains why not many Nigerians repose confidence in
Nigeria’s security, intelligence establishments. Going back to memory lane, Nigeria
suffered one hell of a national security embarrassment, circa 2003, when a seized Russian tanker, MT African Pride with 13 Russian sailors and laden with 30, 000
barrels of crude oil, under the custody of the Nigerian Navy mysteriously
‘disappeared’ without trace till date.
Writer will proceed to highlight few incidents that portray paucity
of intelligence gathering and a proactive security approach in Nigeria.
1.
‘Militant’ Attacks on Lagos, Ogun Communities: Sometime in May 2016 or thereabout, news filtered in that
militants were planning to attack Lagos State. The tidings was swiftly dismissed.
We were told ‘nothing dey happen’, ‘the police is on top of the situation’. People
were told to go about their businesses. Weeks later, daredevil gangs carried
out sporadic attacks, killed scores in Elepete, Muti both in Igbo-Olomu,
Ikorodu, a Lagos suburb and another Ogun community (Ifo). Days after the deed,
we were told that 5,000 policemen and soldiers have been deployed to the
affected communities. This incident would have been averted if the security
agencies took proactive steps to forestall its occurrence rather than reacting
to it.
2.
Proliferation of Arms, Militancy In The Niger Delta: Now the relapse to militancy in the Niger Delta led by the Niger
Delta Avengers and a miscellany of other militant groups in that area further
buttresses the paucity of intelligence and proactive security in Nigeria.
Imagine the manner of sophisticated weapons been overtly brandished by
so-called militants in a country where firearms is prohibited. How do we
explain a situation where after an Amnesty was granted to ex-Niger Delta
militants which led to them surrendering their unserviceable firearms, the Security
and Intelligence agencies literarily went to sleep? Now is the time for the
Nigerian Navy to optimize its Falcon Eye maritime surveillance system in the
Niger Delta.
3.
The Marauding Herdsmen quagmire: Prior to herdsmen attacking Enugu community, the State Governor –
Ugwuanyi reportedly passed Intel to the Police and military authorities of an
impending attack but nothing was done. Whether the herdsmen slaughtering
Nigerians emanate from Libya as some of our leaders unashamedly insinuate or
not, are they also licensed to bear sophisticated weapons and kill at every
slightest provocation? Is it not an indictment on our security agencies and a
national embarrassment that hordes of nomads with cattle supposedly all the way
from Libya, Niger republic, Chad infiltrate from the Northernmost part of
Nigeria and disperse to remotes parts of Nigeria to cause mayhem? Possible the
herdsmen parachute into Nigerian territory, villages?
4.
The Boko Haram Insurgency, Abduction of Chibok Schoolgirls
Scenario: In what started like a child’s play, to our
chagrin, a so-called rag-tag Boko Haram Sect carved out and occupied swathes of
land as its Islamic Caliphate from the Nigerian federation. More than two years
after Boko Haram militants abducted in excess of 200 Chibok schoolgirls,
there’s no credible information as to where the girls are kept. Of a truth, the
inability to locate the missing Chibok schoolgirls is not only an affront on
Nigeria’s security, intelligence agencies but on the intelligence agencies of
other foreign countries that threw their hat to the ring. It sure portends
shrewdness, craftiness to have kept an impenetrable lid on the domicile of
hundreds of girls after two years. Every day we hear in the news that a top
ranking Boko Haram commander or Amir was either killed or captured alive. And
the common sense question here is: if such arrested folks are top Boko Haram
commanders, won’t they spill the beans under interrogation as to the abode of
the Chibok schoolgirls?
5.
Another example of paucity of intelligence gathering and proactive
security in Nigeria is the reported slaughtering
of over 60 police and Department of State Security officers in 2013 by Ombatse
‘cult’ group in Alakyo Nasarawa state when the officers went there on national
assignment. Former DG of the Department of State Security (DSS) stunned
Nigerians when he said the DSS has forgiven Ombatse cult group for killing its
officers. This means nobody was charged, let alone convicted of this heinous
crime?
Nigeria’s Security And
Intelligence, Paper-Tigers?
In addition to the three tiers of the Nigerian Armed forces and
their intelligence wings – the Nigerian Army (Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI) cum the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps - NAIC), Nigerian
Navy (Naval Intelligence) and the Nigerian Air force (Directorate of Air
Intelligence), Nigeria also boasts of the following: the National Intelligence Agency
(NIA) which is tasked with overseeing foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence operations, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) is
responsible for overall military intelligence, the Department of State Security
(DSS) formerly called State Security Service (SSS) is responsible for domestic
intelligence, the Nigeria Police Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence
Department (FCIID), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (Directorate
of Intelligence and Investigation), Nigeria Customs (Customs Intelligent Unit
or CIU), Nigeria Immigration Service (HQ National Intelligence Unit), the
Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), an arm of the global financial
intelligence unit domiciled within the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
tasked with combatting money laundering and terrorism financing, the
Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission
(Intelligence Unit), amongst others. Now the question is: despite the potpourri
security/intelligence agencies, why
do we have wanton insecurity, arms proliferation in Nigeria? Are they just
paper-tigers?
Based on his research and observation, writer proceeds to submit
some of the reasons which account for the inherent inertia, inability of Nigeria’s
security and intelligence agencies to nip insecurity in the bud.
Why Nigerian Security,
Intelligence Agencies Are Wanting
1. Lack of state of the art
technology, gadgets: there is no gainsaying the
fact that technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) revolutionized
intelligence gathering and collection hence less reliance on human intelligence
(HUMINT) which portends more risk. Definitely not implying that HUMINT is not
important; recall that Osama Bin Laden was sniffed out due largely to HUMINT.
For instance, the United States
Global Hawk is an outstanding source of
signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) and so are
Reaper and Predator drones (with lethal capabilities). Similarly the United
States F-35 jet has electronic warfare (EW) capability; it can jam enemy
communications and suppress enemy radars.
2. Paucity of Social Media
Intelligence (SMI or SOCMINT): My essay: ‘’Fighting Terrorism, Insecurity with
Social Media: Tips For Nigeria’s Security Agencies’’ is handy in this regard. There’s a lot of open source intelligence these days on social
media and on the internet. There’s a lot of radicalization, indoctrination
going on online and on social media. Just recently it emerged that the Islamic
State adherents launched a mobile
application to indoctrinate Nigerian
children. How can an ordinary citizen who has got Intel disseminate such to say,
the National Security Adviser, Chief of Defence Staff, Director General of the
National Intelligence Agency or his DSS counterpart anonymously when these
gaffers, their office have not social media – Twitter handle etc.? The
implication is that more often than not, such bosses are detached from reality,
goings-on around them as they depend mainly on skewed ‘’security or
intelligence reports’’ from subordinates. How can the security Nigerian
security and intelligence agencies counter the narrative of Boko Haram or other
extremism contents out there if they lack online, social media presence and are
unresponsive? ‘’This explains why the
following foreign intelligence agencies: FBI (US), CIA (US), MOSSAD (Israel),
GCHQ (UK), MI6 (UK), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),
the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Russian
Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) (SVR), the French
foreign intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité
Extérieure (DGSE), amongst others, all have online presence and are active
on social media. For instance, the
U.S. Military increasingly plugs into Social
Media for intelligence gathering (Social media intelligence, SMI or
SOCMINT). After Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down on July 17, 2014 in
eastern Ukraine killing all 298 on board, a United States Defense Intelligence
Agency analyst sifting social-media communications was one of the first to get
"a hit" of the incident. By the way, what happened to the
multi-million dollar internet surveillance and eavesdropping contract that the
Nigerian government reportedly awarded to Elbit Systems, an Israeli firm?
3. Porous Air, Sea, Land
Borders, Not-so-stringent e-ID Card: During the
Ebola crises, it came to the fore that there are officially, about 1,479 illegal borders in Nigeria. This means aliens, contraband products, arms and ammunition swiftly
waltz in and out of Nigeria through those illegal borders. With such extensive
and un-policed porous air, land borders, it is practically impossible to rein
in the free flow of aliens, arms into Nigeria. As for the Nigerian National
Identity card, folks, non-Nigerians are exploiting inherent weaknesses in the
system to acquire the so-called electronic ID Card. Same applies to the Nigerian
international passport which an average interested foreigner can easily obtain.
Does it not impinge on national security that an Indian company prints Nigeria’s
expatriate permits on behalf of the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS)? Need I
mention that in this age of data breaches, Nigeria is bent in harvesting,
storing fingerprints, personal details of its citizens devoid of a data
protection law and state-of-the-art cybersecurity measures? This writer dwelt
extensively on the implications of this in his write-ups titled: ‘’Nigeria's
e-I.D Card: National Security, Unintended Consequences’’.
4. Unhealthy inter-agency rivalry,
lack of synergy/information sharing: Granted unwholesome
inter-agency rivalry is a global phenomenon but this seem to be more entrenched
and glaring in Nigeria where gaffers tend to place self-aggrandizement ahead of
national interest. During an inter-agency peace-building conference organized
by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, NSCDC, in Abuja, in 2013,
participants drawn from Nigeria’s security and intelligence agencies were in
agreement that, ‘’lack of collaboration amongst the security agencies is one of
the factors responsible for the growth of Boko Haram’’. The then National
Security Adviser, NSA, Col Sambo Dasuki (rtd), who was represented by Major
General Sarki Y. Bello, asserted: “It is pertinent to note that this lack of collaboration among
our security agencies was one of the factors that permitted the growth and,
until recently, the success of Boko Haram terrorist attacks.” Fast forward to
2016, same inter agency rivalry persists. Premium Times Newspaper of 9th
July, 2016 reports that, ‘’President Muhammadu Buhari’s National Security Adviser, NSA,
Babagana Monguno, and the Director General, DG, of the State Security Services
(SSS), Lawal Daura, are locked in a bitter battle for supremacy’’. According to
Premium Times, “The NSA complains that the DG of the DSS is over-reaching
himself and performing his duties”. Recall that prior to this, President
Buhari’s ADC, one Lt. Col. Abubakar Lawal reportedly ordered DSS Operatives out
of strategic points in the presidential villa and there were reports of DSS
officials clashing with Personnel of the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps,
NAIC, deployed to the presidency. This is just a tip of the iceberg as
‘superiority complex’, unhealthy inter-agency rivalry is deep-seated in the
Nigerian security and intelligence circle
5. Poor Funding? It is debatable as to whether or not the Nigerian military and
security agencies are well funded or not. Granted our military spending is
paltry compared to that of the western world but juxtaposed with African
countries, Nigeria doesn’t fare poorly in military spending. To give us an
idea, Global Fire Power index suffices. In 2016, while Egypt with an annual
defense budget of slightly above $4b billion was ranked first in Africa, the Global
Fire Power (GFP) Index ranked Nigeria ($2.3 billion
defense budget) 44th out of 126 countries in the world and 4th
out of 30 African countries with the highest military strength and firepower.
To put this in perspective, same index ranked Ghana 19th in Africa,
Cameroon 20th, Kenya 11th, and Tanzania 17th
and so on and so forth.
6. Corruption: Sometime in 2015, Premium
Times Newspaper posited that, ‘’Nigeria spent N4.62 trillion on National Security in the
last 5 years, yet widespread insecurity remains’’. This certainly does not
measure up with security budgets of many Western climes but is quite
considerable when juxtaposed with budgets of some African countries as seen in
the preceding paragraph. The gist is that as a result of pervasive corruption, more
often than not, Nigeria’s security budgets end up in private pockets of the top
brass of those organizations. An ex Airforce gaffer purportedly plundered more than N500
million (five hundred million) naira monthly from the Nigerian Air force while SaharaReporters allege that a former Army boss reportedly raked in N1 billion monthly from the Nigerian Army.
There will be a whole lot of difference and improvement in National security if
the money appropriated to the military and security agencies are judiciously
utilized.
7. Negligence, sweeping Intel under the carpet or not acting on them:
An acquaintance of mine that served in the Army Intelligence Corps in Maiduguri
back in the 1990’s told me how they wrote reports of arms proliferation and
build-up in the North-East prior to Boko Haram uprising but their reports were
swept under the carpet by their superiors and the Borno state government
authorities then. Moving on…is there a stringent monitoring of private jetty’s
in Nigeria? Grapevine suggests contraband, illegal stuff come in through
private jetty’s in Nigeria.
8. Nepotism (Na mu ne in Hausa, tinwa-tinwa in Yoruba, Ima mmadu in Igbo) languages is our bane
in Nigeria. This entails recruiting
folks not qualified, not passionate about the job simply because they know one
big shot or the other. This writer served in the armed forces and is abreast of
the goings-on, a couple of things inherent in the Nigerian Armed forces. In
many advanced climes, academically bright students are headhunted right from
their studies in Ivy League schools to serve in the security and intelligence
agencies. This cannot be said of Nigeria’s NIA, DIA, DSS, FCIIB et al. I dare
say that not up to 20 percent of cadets in the Nigerian Defence Academy got in
there by merit. This nepotism phenomenon also plays out in postings or
deployments and promotions where unqualified and undeserving officers,
personnel are deployed to sensitive positions or promoted because they have
godfathers.
9. Lack of stringent
background checks on prospective recruits: Due to
lack of stringing background checks in Nigeria, there are insinuations of ex-convicts,
cultists etc. enlisting into the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies.
10.
Partisanship and bootlicking: The same accusation of partisanship, bootlicking that bogged Nigeria’s
security establishments; particularly the DSS during the presidency of Jonathan
has relapsed now that that President Buhari is in power. Security and
intelligence agencies are national institutions hence their allegiance is
supposed to be first to the country and not as apron strings of the political
party in power. Security agents must be apolitical patriotic citizens; they
should learn from history and shy away from partisanship, politics. Where’s
Marilyn Ogar, the former spokesperson of the DSS under President Jonathan’s
government today?
Conclusion:
An Igbo proverb says, ‘’onaghi adi mma mmiri zoocha echenyewa
oku’’. A rough translation means – it makes no sense to bring kegs to fetch
rain water after the rain has stopped. Let it not be seen that Nigerian
security and intelligence agencies are more adept at harassing, bullying,
indulging in extrajudicial killings than in combatting or nipping insecurity,
crime in the bud. If we can’t have ‘State Police’ now then
let’s have community policing which entails police officers working the beats
and been closer to the crime scene rather than stay at the counters in police
stations. It is commendable that the new Inspector General of Police has
ordered the withdrawal of mobile police officers attached to individuals, we
pray this action will be enforced to the latter and not initial gara gara (IGG)
as we call it in Nigeria.
Let’s take a cue from the United States and France. Due to what it
called, “failure of intelligence”, the United States restructured its Intelligence agencies aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attack. As recently as July 5, 2016, French MPs recommended an overhaul of its intelligence in the wake of 2015 Paris attacks.
We appreciate the sacrifices, efforts of our security agents hence this is not
a scathing attack on them, just a way of nudging them to up their game. We
cannot continue doing the same thing, the same way and expect different
results. If Nigeria must rein in wanton insecurity, terrorism, militancy and
instability, then it’s high time our old-school, reactive Security, Intelligence agencies were restructured to be proactive,
innovative! Nigerian security and intelligence establishments MUST
enlist the brightest and best in its fold, embrace state-of-the-art technology
and eschew corruption.
Written
by:
© Don Okereke
(Security
Junkie/Analyst/Consultant, Writer)
Twitter:
@donokereke
July,
2016
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