This incisive article was written on April 30, 2003, by historian and political scientist Jacques Pauwels.
Wars are a terrible waste of lives and resources, and for that reason
most people are in principle opposed to wars. The American President,
on the other hand, seems to love war. Why?
Many commentators have sought
the answer in psychological factors. Some opined that George W. Bush
considered it his duty to finish the job started, but for some obscure
reason not completed, by his father at the time of the Gulf War; others
believe that Bush Junior expected a short and triumphant war which would
guarantee him a second term in the White House.
I believe that we must look elsewhere for an explanation for the attitude of the American President.
The fact that Bush is keen on war has little or nothing to do with
his psyche, but a great deal with the American economic system. This
system – America’s brand of capitalism – functions first and foremost to
make extremely rich Americans like the Bush “money dynasty” even
richer. Without warm or cold wars, however, this system can no longer
produce the expected result in the form of the ever-higher profits the
moneyed and powerful of America consider as their birthright.
The great strength of American capitalism is also its great weakness,
namely, its extremely high productivity. In the historical development
of the international economic system that we call capitalism, a number
of factors have produced enormous increases in productivity, for
example, the mechanization of the production process that got under way
in England as early as the 18th century. In the early 20th century,
then, American industrialists made a crucial contribution in the form of
the automatization of work by means of new techniques such as the
assembly line. The latter was an innovation introduced by Henry Ford,
and those techniques have therefore become collectively known as
“Fordism.” The productivity of the great American enterprises rose
spectacularly.
For example, already in the 1920s, countless vehicles rolled off the
assembly lines of the automobile factories of Michigan every single day.
But who was supposed to buy all those cars? Most Americans at the time
did not have sufficiently robust pocket books for such a purchase. Other
industrial products similarly flooded the market, and the result was
the emergence of a chronic disharmony between the ever-increasing
economic supply and the lagging demand. Thus arose the economic crisis
generally known as the Great Depression. It was essentially a crisis of
overproduction. Warehouses were bursting with unsold commodities,
factories laid off workers, unemployment exploded, and so the purchasing
power of the American people shrunk even more, making the crisis even
worse.
It cannot be denied that in America the Great Depression only ended
during, and because of, the Second World War. (Even the greatest
admirers of President Roosevelt admit that his much-publicized New Deal
policies brought little or no relief.) Economic demand rose
spectacularly when the war which had started in Europe, and in which the
USA itself was not an active participant before 1942, allowed American
industry to produce unlimited amounts of war equipment. Between 1940 and
1945, the American state would spend no less than 185 billion dollar on
such equipment, and the military expenditures’ share of the GNP thus
rose between 1939 and 1945 from an insignificant 1,5 per cent to
approximately 40 per cent. In addition, American industry also supplied
gargantuan amounts of equipment to the British and even the Soviets via
Lend-Lease. (In Germany, meanwhile, the subsidiaries of American
corporations such as Ford, GM, and ITT produced all sorts of planes and
tanks and other martial toys for the Nazi’s, also after Pearl Harbor,
but that is a different story.) The key problem of the Great Depression –
the disequilibrium between supply and demand – was thus resolved
because the state “primed the pump” of economic demand by means of huge
orders of a military nature.
As far as ordinary Americans were concerned, Washington’s military
spending orgy brought not only virtually full employment but also much
higher wages than ever before; it was during the Second World War that
the widespread misery associated with the Great Depression came to an
end and that a majority of the American people achieved an unprecedented
degree of prosperity. However, the greatest beneficiaries by far of the
wartime economic boom were the country’s businesspeople and
corporations, who realized extraordinary profits. Between 1942 and 1945,
writes the historian Stuart D. Brandes, the net profits of America’s
2,000 biggest firms were more than 40 per cent higher than during the
period 1936-1939. Such a “profit boom” was possible, he explains,
because the state ordered billions of dollars of military equipment,
failed to institute price controls, and taxed profits little if at all.
This largesse benefited the American business world in general, but in
particular that relatively restricted elite of big corporations known as
“big business” or “corporate America.” During the war, a total of less
than 60 firms obtained 75 per cent of all lucrative military and other
state orders. The big corporations – Ford, IBM, etc. – revealed
themselves to be the “war hogs,” writes Brandes, that gormandized at the
plentiful trough of the state’s military expenditures. IBM, for
example, increased its annual sales between 1940 and 1945 from 46 to 140
million dollar thanks to war-related orders, and its profits
skyrocketed accordingly.
America’s big corporations exploited their Fordist expertise to the
fullest in order to boost production, but even that was not sufficient
to meet the wartime needs of the American state. Much more equipment was
needed, and in order to produce it, America needed new factories and
even more efficient technology. These new assets were duly stamped out
of the ground, and on account of this the total value of all productive
facilities of the nation increased between 1939 and 1945 from 40 to 66
billion dollar. However, it was not the private sector that undertook
all these new investments; on account of its disagreeable experiences
with overproduction during the thirties, America’s businesspeople found
this task too risky. So the state did the job by investing 17 billion
dollar in more than 2,000 defense-related projects. In return for a
nominal fee, privately owned corporations were permitted to rent these
brand-new factories in order to produce…and to make money by selling the
output back to the state. Moreover, when the war was over and
Washington decided to divest itself of these investments, the nation’s
big corporations purchased them for half, and in many cases only one
third, of the real value.
How did America finance the war, how did Washington pay the lofty
bills presented by GM, ITT, and the other corporate suppliers of war
equipment? The answer is: partly by means of taxation – about 45 per
cent -, but much more through loans – approximately 55 per cent. On
account of this, the public debt increased dramatically, namely, from 3
billion dollar in 1939 to no less than 45 billion dollar in 1945. In
theory, this debt should have been reduced, or wiped out altogether, by
levying taxes on the huge profits pocketed during the war by America’s
big corporations, but the reality was different. As already noted, the
American state failed to meaningfully tax corporate America’s windfall
profits, allowed the public debt to mushroom, and paid its bills, and
the interest on its loans, with its general revenues, that is, by means
of the income generated by direct and indirect taxes. Particularly on
account of the regressive Revenue Act introduced in October 1942, these
taxes were paid increasingly by workers and other low-income Americans,
rather than by the super-rich and the corporations of which the latter
were the owners, major shareholders, and/or top managers. “The burden of
financing the war,” observes the American historian Sean Dennis
Cashman, “[was] sloughed firmly upon the shoulders of the poorer members
of society.”
However, the American public, preoccupied by the war and blinded by
the bright sun of full employment and high wages, failed to notice this.
Affluent Americans, on the other hand, were keenly aware of the
wonderful way in which the war generated money for themselves and for
their corporations. Incidentally, it was also from the rich
businesspeople, bankers, insurers and other big investors that
Washington borrowed the money needed to finance the war; corporate
America thus also profited from the war by pocketing the lion’s share of
the interests generated by the purchase of the famous war bonds. In
theory, at least, the rich and powerful of America are the great
champions of so-called free enterprise, and they oppose any form of
state intervention in the economy. During the war, however, they never
raised any objections to the way in which the American state managed and
financed the economy, because without this large-scale dirigist
violation of the rules of free enterprise, their collective wealth could
never have proliferated as it did during those years.
During the Second World War, the wealthy owners and top managers of
the big corporations learned a very important lesson: during a war there
is money to be made, lots of money. In other words, the arduous task of
maximizing profits – the key activity within the capitalist American
economy – can be absolved much more efficiently through war than through
peace; however, the benevolent cooperation of the state is required.
Ever since the Second World War, the rich and powerful of America have
remained keenly conscious of this. So is their man in the White House
today [2003, i.e. George W. Bush], the scion of a “money dynasty” who
was parachuted into the White House in order to promote the interests of
his wealthy family members, friends, and associates in corporate
America, the interests of money, privilege, and power.
In the spring of 1945 it was obvious that the war, fountainhead of
fabulous profits, would soon be over. What would happen then? Among the
economists, many Cassandras conjured up scenarios that loomed extremely
unpleasant for America’s political and industrial leaders. During the
war, Washington’s purchases of military equipment, and nothing else, had
restored the economic demand and thus made possible not only full
employment but also unprecedented profits. With the return of peace, the
ghost of disharmony between supply and demand threatened to return to
haunt America again, and the resulting crisis might well be even more
acute than the Great Depression of the “dirty thirties,” because during
the war years the productive capacity of the nation had increased
considerably, as we have seen. Workers would have to be laid off
precisely at the moment when millions of war veterans would come home
looking for a civilian job, and the resulting unemployment and decline
in purchasing power would aggravate the demand deficit. Seen from the
perspective of America’s rich and powerful, the coming unemployment was
not a problem; what did matter was that the golden age of gargantuan
profits would come to an end. Such a catastrophe had to be prevented,
but how?
Military state expenditures were the source of high profits. In order
to keep the profits gushing forth generously, new enemies and new war
threats were urgently needed now that Germany and Japan were defeated.
How fortunate that the Soviet Union existed, a country which during the
war had been a particularly useful partner who had pulled the chestnuts
out of the fire for the Allies in Stalingrad and elsewhere, but also a
partner whose communist ideas and practices allowed it to be easily
transformed into the new bogeyman of the United States. Most American
historians now admit that in 1945 the Soviet Union, a country that had
suffered enormously during the war, did not constitute a threat at all
to the economically and militarily far superior USA, and that Washington
itself did not perceive the Soviets as a threat. These historians also
acknowledge that Moscow was very keen to work closely together with
Washington in the postwar era.
Indeed, Moscow had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, from a
conflict with superpower America, which was brimming with confidence
thanks to its monopoly of the atom bomb. However, America – corporate
America, the America of the super-rich – urgently needed a new enemy in
order to justify the titanic expenditures for “defense” which were
needed to keep the wheels of the nation’s economy spinning at full speed
also after the end of the war, thus keeping profit margins at the
required – or rather, desired – high levels, or even to increase them.
It is for this reason that the Cold War was unleashed in 1945, not by
the Soviets but by the American “military-industrial” complex, as
President Eisenhower would call that elite of wealthy individuals and
corporations that knew how to profit from the “warfare economy.”
In this respect, the Cold War exceeded their fondest expectations.
More and more martial equipment had to be cranked out, because the
allies within the so-called “free world”, which actually included plenty
of nasty dictatorships, had to be armed to the teeth with US equipment.
In addition, America’s own armed forces never ceased demanding bigger,
better, and more sophisticated tanks, planes, rockets, and, yes,
chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. For these goods, the Pentagon was always ready to pay huge
sums without asking difficult questions. As had been the case during the
Second World War, it was again primarily the large corporations who
were allowed to fill the orders. The Cold War generated unprecedented
profits, and they flowed into the coffers of those extremely wealthy
individuals who happened to be the owners, top managers, and/or major
shareholders of these corporations. (Does it come as a surprise that in
the United States newly retired Pentagon generals are routinely offered
jobs as consultants by large corporations involved in military
production, and that businessmen linked with those corporations are
regularly appointed as high-ranking officials of the Department of
Defense, as advisors of the President, etc.?)
During the Cold War too, the American state financed its skyrocketing
military expenditures by means of loans, and this caused the public
debt to rise to dizzying heights. In 1945 the public debt stood at
“only” 258 billion dollar, but in 1990 – when the Cold War ground to an
end – it amounted to no less than 3.2 trillion dollar! This was a
stupendous increase, also when one takes the inflation rate into
account, and it caused the American state to become the world’s greatest
debtor. (Incidentally, in July 2002 the American public debt had
reached 6.1 trillion dollar.) Washington could and should have covered
the cost of the Cold War by taxing the huge profits achieved by the
corporations involved in the armament orgy, but there was never any
question of such a thing. In 1945, when the Second World War come to an
end and the Cold War picked up the slack, corporations still paid 50 per
cent of all taxes, but during the course of the Cold War this share
shrunk consistently, and today it only amounts to approximately 1 per
cent.
This was possible because the nation’s big corporations largely
determine what the government in Washington may or may not do, also in
the field of fiscal policy. In addition, lowering the tax burden of
corporations was made easier because after the Second World War these
corporations transformed themselves into multinationals, “at home
everywhere and nowhere,” as an American author has written in connection
with ITT, and therefore find it easy to avoid paying meaningful taxes
anywhere. Stateside, where they pocket the biggest profits, 37 per cent
of all American multinationals – and more than 70 per cent of all
foreign multinationals – paid not a single dollar of taxes in 1991,
while the remaining multinationals remitted less than 1 per cent of
their profits in taxes.
The sky-high costs of the Cold War were thus not borne by those who
profited from it and who, incidentally, also continued to pocket the
lion’s share of the dividends paid on government bonds, but by the
American workers and the American middle class. These low- and
middle-income Americans did not receive a penny from the profits yielded
so profusely by the Cold War, but they did receive their share of the
enormous public debt for which that conflict was largely responsible. It
is they, therefore, who were really saddled with the costs of the Cold
War, and it is they who continue to pay with their taxes for a
disproportionate share of the burden of the public debt.
In other words, while the profits generated by the Cold War were privatized to the advantage of an extremely wealthy elite, its costs were ruthlessly socialized
to the great detriment of all other Americans. During the Cold War, the
American economy degenerated into a gigantic swindle, into a perverse
redistribution of the nation’s wealth to the advantage of the rich and
to the disadvantage not only of the poor and of the working class but
also of the middle class, whose members tend to subscribe to the myth
that the American capitalist system serves their interests. Indeed,
while the wealthy and powerful of America accumulated ever-greater
riches, the prosperity achieved by many other Americans during the
Second World War was gradually eroded, and the general standard of
living declined slowly but steadily.
During the Second World War America had witnessed a modest
redistribution of the collective wealth of the nation to the advantage
of the less privileged members of society. During the Cold War, however,
the rich Americans became richer while the non-wealthy – and certainly
not only the poor – became poorer. In 1989, the year the Cold War
petered out, more than 13 per cent of all Americans – approximately 31
million individuals – were poor according to the official criteria of
poverty, which definitely understate the problem. Conversely, today 1
per cent of all Americans own no less than 34 per cent of the nation’s
aggregate wealth. In no major “Western” country is the wealth
distributed more unevenly.
The minuscule percentage of super-rich Americans found this
development extremely satisfactory. They loved the idea of accumulating
more and more wealth, of aggrandizing their already huge assets, at the
expense of the less privileged. They wanted to keep things that way or,
if at all possible, make this sublime scheme even more efficient.
However, all good things must come to an end, and in 1989/90 the
bountiful Cold War elapsed. That presented a serious problem. Ordinary
Americans, who knew that they had borne the costs of this war, expected a
“peace dividend.”
They thought that the money the state had spent on military
expenditures might now be used to produce benefits for themselves, for
example in the form of a national health insurance and other social
benefits which Americans in contrast to most Europeans have never
enjoyed. In 1992, Bill Clinton would actually win the presidential
election by dangling out the prospect of a national health plan, which
of course never materialized. A “peace dividend” was of no interest
whatsoever to the nation’s wealthy elite, because the provision of
social services by the state does not yield profits for entrepreneurs
and corporations, and certainly not the lofty kind of profits generated
by military state expenditures. Something had to be done, and had to be
done fast, to prevent the threatening implosion of the state’s military
spending.
America, or rather, corporate America, was orphaned of its useful
Soviet enemy, and urgently needed to conjure up new enemies and new
threats in order to justify a high level of military spending. It is in
this context that in 1990 Saddam Hussein appeared on the scene like a
kind of deus ex machina. This tin-pot dictator had previously
been perceived and treated by the Americans as a good friend, and he had
been armed to the teeth so that he could wage a nasty war against Iran;
it was the USA – and allies such as Germany – who originally supplied
him with all sorts of weapons. However, Washington was desperately in
need of a new enemy, and suddenly fingered him as a terribly dangerous
“new Hitler,” against whom war needed to be waged urgently, even though
it was clear that a negotiated settlement of the issue of Iraq’s
occupation of Kuwait was not out of the question.
George Bush Senior was the casting agent who discovered this useful
new nemesis of America, and who unleashed the Gulf War, during which
Baghdad was showered with bombs and Saddam’s hapless recruits were
slaughtered in the desert. The road to the Iraqi capital lay wide-open,
but the Marines’ triumphant entry into Baghdad was suddenly scrapped.
Saddam Hussein was left in power so that the threat he was supposed to
form might be invoked again in order to justify keeping America in arms.
After all, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union had shown how
inconvenient it can be when one loses a useful foe.
And so Mars could remain the patron saint of the American economy or,
more accurately, the godfather of the corporate Mafia that manipulates
this war-driven economy and reaps its huge profits without bearing its
costs. The despised project of a peace dividend could be unceremoniously
buried, and military expenditures could remain the dynamo of the
economy and the wellspring of sufficiently high profits. Those
expenditures increased relentlessly during the 1990s. In 1996, for
example, they amounted to no less than 265 billion dollars, but when one
adds the unofficial and/or indirect military expenditures, such as the
interests paid on loans used to finance past wars, the 1996 total came
to approximately 494 billion dollar, amounting to an outlay of 1.3
billion dollar per day! However, with only a considerably chastened
Saddam as bogeyman, Washington found it expedient also to look elsewhere
for new enemies and threats. Somalia temporarily looked promising, but
in due course another “new Hitler” was identified in the Balkan
Peninsula in the person of the Serbian leader, Milosevic. During much of
the nineties, then, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia provided the
required pretexts for military interventions, large-scale bombing
operations, and the purchase of more and newer weapons.
The “warfare economy” could thus continue to run on all cylinders
also after the Gulf War. However, in view of occasional public pressure
such as the demand for a peace dividend, it is not easy to keep this
system going. (The media present no problem, as newspapers, magazines,
TV stations, etc. are either owned by big corporations or rely on them
for advertising revenue.) As mentioned earlier, the state has to
cooperate, so in Washington one needs men and women one can count upon,
preferably individuals from the very own corporate ranks, individuals
totally committed to use the instrument of military expenditures in
order to provide the high profits that are needed to make the very rich
of America even richer. In this respect, Bill Clinton had fallen short
of expectations, and corporate America could never forgive his original
sin, namely, that he had managed to have himself elected by promising
the American people a “peace dividend” in the form of a system of health
insurance.
On account of this, in 2000 it was arranged that not the
Clinton-clone Al Gore moved into the White House but a team of
militarist hardliners, virtually without exception representatives of
wealthy, corporate America, such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice, and of
course George W. Bush himself, son of the man who had shown with his
Gulf War how it could be done; the Pentagon, too, was directly
represented in the Bush Cabinet in the person of the allegedly
peace-loving Powell, in reality yet another angel of death. Rambo moved
into the White House, and it did not take long for the results to show.
After Bush Junior had been catapulted into the presidency, it looked
for some time as if he was going to proclaim China as the new nemesis of
America. However, a conflict with that giant loomed somewhat risky;
furthermore, all too many big corporations make good money by trading
with the People’s Republic. Another threat, preferably less dangerous
and more credible, was required to keep the military expenditures at a
sufficiently high level. For this purpose, Bush and Rumsfeld and company
could have wished for nothing more convenient than the events of
September 11, 2001; it is extremely likely that they were aware of the
preparations for these monstrous attacks, but that they did nothing to
prevent them because they knew that they would be able to benefit from
them. In any event, they did take full advantage of this opportunity in
order to militarize America more than ever before, to shower bombs on
people who had nothing to do with 9/11, to wage war to their hearts’
content, and thus for corporations that do business with the Pentagon to
ring up unprecedented sales. Bush declared war not on a country but on
terrorism, an abstract concept against which one cannot really wage war
and against which a definitive victory can never be achieved. However,
in practice the slogan “war against terrorism” meant that Washington now
reserves the right to wage war worldwide and permanently against
whomever the White House defines as a terrorist.
And so the problem of the end of the Cold War was definitively
resolved, as there was henceforth a justification for ever-increasing
military expenditures. The statistics speak for themselves. The 1996
total of 265 billion dollar in military expenditures had already been
astronomical, but thanks to Bush Junior the Pentagon was allowed to
spend 350 billion in 2002, and for 2003 the President has promised
approximately 390 billion; however, it is now virtually certain that the
cape of 400 billion dollar will be rounded this year. (In order to
finance this military spending orgy, money has to be saved elsewhere,
for example by cancelling free lunches for poor children; every little
bit helps.) No wonder that George W. struts around beaming with
happiness and pride, for he – essentially a spoiled rich kid of very
limited talent and intellect – has surpassed the boldest expectations
not only of his wealthy family and friends but of corporate America as a
whole, to which he owes his job.
9/11 provided Bush with carte blanche to wage war wherever and
against whomever he chose, and as this essay has purported to make
clear, it does not matter all that much who happens to be fingered as
enemy du jour. Last year, Bush showered bombs on Afghanistan, presumably
because the leaders of that country sheltered Bin Laden, but recently
the latter went out of fashion and it was once again Saddam Hussein who
allegedly threatened America. We cannot deal here in detail with the
specific reasons why Bush’s America absolutely wanted war with the Iraq
of Saddam Hussein and not with, say, North Korea. A major reason for
fighting this particular war was that Iraq’s large reserves of oil are
lusted after by the US oil trusts with whom the Bushes themselves – and
Bushites such as Cheney and Rice, after whom an oil tanker happens to be
named – are so intimately linked. The war in Iraq is also useful as a
lesson to other Third World countries who fail to dance to Washington’s
tune, and as an instrument for emasculating domestic opposition and
ramming the extreme right-wing program of an unelected president down
the throats of Americans themselves.
The America of wealth and privilege is hooked on war, without regular
and ever-stronger doses of war it can no longer function properly, that
is, yield the desired profits. Right now, this addiction, this craving
is being satisfied by means of a conflict against Iraq, which also
happens to be dear to the hearts of the oil barons. However, does
anybody believe that the warmongering will stop once Saddam’ scalp will
join the Taliban turbans in the trophy display case of George W. Bush?
The President has already pointed his finger at those whose turn will
soon come, namely, the “axis of evil” countries: Iran, Syria, Lybia,
Somalia, North Korea, and of course that old thorn in the side of
America, Cuba. Welcome to the 21st century, welcome to George W. Bush’s
brave new era of permanent war!
Jacques R. Pauwels is
historian and political scientist, author of ‘The Myth of the Good War:
America in the Second World War’ (James Lorimer, Toronto, 2002). His
book is published in different languages: in English, Dutch, German,
Spanish, Italian and French. Together with personalities like Ramsey
Clark, Michael Parenti, William Blum, Robert Weil, Michel Collon, Peter
Franssen and many others… he signed “The International Appeal against
US-War”.
Source:
Centre for Global Research on Globalization
www.globalresearch.ca
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