THIS week, Boko Haram continued
its campaign against security forces in the North East. Chad experienced two
attacks, the first being an incident in which three IEDs were detonated. One
was at a fish market and the other two at a refugee camp resulting in the death
of no fewer than 37 persons.
The second Boko Haram attack in Chad was a frontal
one on Chadian soldiers. The insurgents attacked them at their positions about
4.30 a.m. Seventeen Boko Haram fighters were killed. The nation lost a few
soldiers and 13 were wounded.
In Niger, three suicide bombers
died when their IEDs prematurely detonated en-route to their intended targets.
The Boko Haram offensive took place in neighboring Niger and Chad despite the
recent deployment of the regional Multinational Joint Task Force. The insurgent
group, not wanting to go down without a fight, is doing all it can to counter
the military campaign.
These regional attacks
re-emphasise the imperative of actively tackling the issue of porous borders to
curb ease of movements and to prevent transfer of weapons and knowledge within
the region. Several intelligence collection technologies which can track border
movements exist. Therefore, the regional governments need to consider a
collaborative effort to employ them. These tools will help the security
professionals to identify obscured border crossing routes the insurgents use.
In Yobe State, three IEDs
detonated, killing 15 civilians, one at a settlement behind a housing estate.
The second one detonated at a mosque in a government workers’ housing estate
called Buhari Housing Estate and the third at a shopping center within the same
estate.
Also in Yobe, a military base
was attacked overnight by a large group of insurgents which the Army said
resulted in the death of 100 terrorists! Two lessons arise from this. The first
is that the security personnel appear to be reactive, evident in their being
caught off guard. The second is these attacks could also be indicative of major
intelligence collection paucity.
The Army chief visited the Yobe
military camp and expressed his displeasure that despite all the advanced
military weapons and equipment available at the base, to ward off the
insurgents, his men did not use them proactively, by going after the
insurgents, while at the same time protect themselves and the surrounding
communities. In other words, the troops did not take an offensive strategy
which is the central part of counter-terrorism operations. The terrorists must
be found out and their attack plans foiled before they are able to strike. Once
an attack occurs, it is usually seen as a counter-terrorism failure.
After the Abuja bombing which
took place earlier this month, security and surveillance was increased across
the capital territory. Meetings of security experts were conveyed, questions
about the lack of a functioning CCTV around the state were asked. However, all
these things comprise reactive actions. Counter terrorism strategies require
that the security apparatus of the nation are proactive in identifying possible
attacks before they occur. This is where running efficient and effective
intelligence organisations comes in.
Intelligence lapse
A good intelligence collection
apparatus should have advance indications and warnings about an imminent
attack. If a group of 100 insurgents are congregating, planning and mobilising
for an attack, active and effective intelligence analysts should be able to get
wind of the activity, be it visually through 24hour aerial surveillance, or via
interception of insurgent communications or perhaps through network of
informants on the ground. Looking at it from this perspective, it is easy to
see why the Army chief was displeased about the lack of active intelligence
gathering which could have given the troops in Yobe forewarning and saved
lives.
Some members of the opposing
political party called for an overhaul of the country’s security and
intelligence agencies. In reality, when a terrorist attack occurs, intelligence
agencies are usually blamed for the blunder. For example, the 9/11 attacks on
the World Trade Center was seen as a U.S. intelligence failure. Intelligence
personnel denied this accusation. However, further investigation into the
matter revealed that there were some short-comings within the intelligence
community. One of these weak points was lack of information sharing. For that
reason, the U.S. government and intelligence leadership put measures in place
that helped increase information sharing to forestall a reoccurrence on its
soil.
Intelligence agencies prevent
terrorist attacks on a daily basis. Many of these foiled attacks go unreported.
However, when one attack occurs, the intelligence community is blamed for
missing it. Similarly, when multiple attacks keep occurring, it is a sign that
some form of an extensive overhaul does need to occur. Naturally, intelligence
personnel will differ, however, the answers are in the results.
Identifying the insurgent
networks
Despite these infirmities, the
Army reported the capture of several key Boko Haram individuals including their
financier and stimulant dealer. He was arrested in Bama with N1million cash and
some other items. Another suspected Boko Haram sponsor, who has been parading
himself as a military brigadier general, was also apprehended. More Boko Haram
members were arrested based on the confessions of those apprehended.
The military released the names
of the individuals arrested and security organizations can use these names to
carry out social network analysis on the insurgents which will help identify
the decentralised cells and the connections of the various insurgent groups. An
example of the effective use of social network analysis was in the case of the
hunt for Osama Bin Laden. Intelligence organisations through interrogation
received the name of an Al-Qaida operative called Al-Kuwaiti. Through social
network analysis and communication interception, Al-Kuwaiti was identified as a
courier who lived with his brother and another high valued target (Osama) in
Pakistan.
The point of all this is that
combating insurgency and terrorism requires effective and efficient
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, and ground troops should
be acting based on intelligence received. Dealing with our Boko Haram
insurgency will require the use of intelligence tools, techniques and software
as a part of the nation’s counter terrorism and counter insurgency strategies.
Written By: Tanwa Ahiru
Ashiru is the founder of Bulwark Intelligence and is a U.S. Air Force
veteran with over 12 years in All-Source Intelligence and counter improvised
explosive device (CIED) Analysis. She has been involved in counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism operations in support of Multi-National Forces in
Southwest Asia, Middle East and North Africa.
Source: Guardian Newspaper
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